CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT 

FOR 

THREE  PRESIDENTS  INSTEAD  OF  ONE. 


THE  EXPOSITION 

OF 

THE  PROPOSED  PLURAL  EXECUTIVE 

SUBMITTED 

TO  THE  COMMITTEE  IN  CONGRESS  MAY  27.  1878, 

By  t:  -  w.  bartley. 


WM.  H.  MOORE,  PRINTER,  WASHINGTON. 


AN  EXPOSITION 

OF  THE 

%§toym&  §  Jural  §xmtm  of  tto  j^iste 


To  the  Honorable,  The  Members  of  the  Commit- 
tee of  the  House  of  Representatives,  on 
the  Revision  of  the  Laws  relating 
to  the  Election  of 

PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


The  undersigned  begs  leave  to  submit  most  respectfully 
the  following  views  in  support  of  the  proposed  amendment 
of  the  Constitution,  pending  before  the  Committee,  in  re- 
lation to  a  plural  Executive. 


Preliminary  Remarks. 

It  is  well  said,  in  the  preamble  to  the  Resolutions,  that 
the  framers  of  the  constitution  did  not  pretend,  that  the  in- 
strument by  them  ^formed  was  perfect;  on  the  contrary, 
they  expressly  provided  a  convenient  mode  for  amending 
the  same,  as  experience  and  the  growth  of  the  country 
should  show  to  be  expedieut  and  proper. 

And  it  is  further  said  in  the  preamble,  that  the  vast  ex- 
tension of  the  territory  and  increase  of  the  population  of 
the  United  States,  (not  anticipated  when  the  present  con- 
stitution was  adopted,)  have  so  much  augmented  the  pow- 
ers and  extended  and  complicated  the  duties  and  responsi- 


bilities  of  the  Chief  Executive  Office,  that  the  administra- 
tion of  the  same,  with  a  full  comprehension  of  the  great 
questions  of  public  policy  involving  the  interests  of  the 
country,  most  manifestly  requires  additional  force  to  give 
full  efficiency  to  the  Executive  authority  of  the  United 
States. 

It  is,  therefore,  proposed  so  to  amend  the  constitution  as 
to  provide  for  the  election  of  three  Presidents,  to  consti- 
tute a  Supreme  Executive  Council,  to  be  elected  by  the 
qualified  electors  of  all  the  States,  and  each  of  the  three 
to  be  taken  from  one  of  the  three  distinctive  sections  of 
the  United  States,  known,  one  as  the  Western  States,  one 
as  the  Eastern  and  Middle  States,  and  the  other  as  the 
Southern  States,  and  no  two  of  the  presidents  to  be  citi- 
zens of  the  same  section. 

This  is  not  a  proposition  to  revolutionize  the  govern- 
ment, but  simply  to  amend  the  constitution  in  accordance 
with  its  own  terms,  and  in  furtherance  of  its  own  true  objects 
and  intent.  And  it  is  a  change  which  is  essential  to  per- 
fect our  political  system  as  a  representative  republic,  and 
perpetuate  popular  government  in  this  country. 

Popular  Representation  the  Basis  of  Republican  Government. 

As  the  government  of  the  United  States  was  intended 
by  the  American  people  to  be  a  representative  republic  it 
is  essentially  important,  that  representation,  the  fundamen- 
tal pillar  in  that  form  of  government,  should  be  as  perfect 
and  complete  as  practicable  in  all  its  departments.  And 
inasmuch  as  the  country  has  grown  and  been  enlarged 
from  the  original  thirteen  States  with  a  population  of  some 
three  millions,  to  thirty-eight  States  with  a  population  of 
forty  millions,  extending  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific 
ocean,  and  from  the  great  Lakes  of  the  north  to  the  Rio 
Grande  river  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  there  is  a  propriety 
as  well  as  a  necessity,  that  popular  representation  should 
be  enlarged  as  far  as  practicable,  so  that  the  people  of  each 
distinctive  section  of  the  country  should  be  fairly  represen- 


3 


ted  in  the  Executive  as  well  as  in  the  other  two  departments 
of  the  government. 

The  people  of  the  great  West  extending  to  the  Pacific 
coast,  engaged  in  agricultural,  grazing,  and  mining  pur- 
suits, have  their  peculiar  interests,  customs,  and  views,  not 
to  be  overlooked  in  the  conduct  of  the  public  affairs.  The 
people  of  the  Eastern  and  Middle  States,  engaged  in  man- 
ufacturing and  commerial  pursuits  as  well  as  agricultural, 
have  their  distinct  interests,  pursuits  and  civilization  de- 
manding the  attention  and  care  of  the  government.  And 
the  people  of  the  Southern  States,  engaged  in  the  produc- 
tion of  the  great  staples  of  cotton,  sugar,  rice  and  tobacco, 
have  also  their  distinctive  interests,  habits  and  conditions 
of  life  requiring  attentiou  and  consideration  at  the  hands 
of  the  government.  No  one  man  as  the  Executive,  what- 
ever may  be  his  capacity,  can  fully  comprehend,  and  give 
proper  attention  to  the  vast  and  diversified  interests  of  thi3 
immense  scope  of  country.  The  cabinet  officers,  who  are 
subordinates  and  the  president's  little  coterie  of  personal 
and  political  friends,  are  never  selected  as  representatives 
of  the  distinct  sections  and  interests  of  this  vast  country, 
and  when  any  one  of  them  amounts  to  anything  more  than 
the  political  leader,  or  mere  figure-head  of  his  department, 
the  routine  department  business  is  sufficient  to  occupy  his 
entire  attention.  And  for  the  last  eighteen  years  neither 
the  far  west  nor  the  south  have  been  actually  in  the  true 
spirit  of  the  country  represented  even  in  the  cabinet.  Men 
come  to  Washington  from  distances  exceeding  two  thou- 
sand miles,  and  from  foreign  countries,  charged  with  very 
important  matters  to  be  laid  before  the  Chief  Executive, 
and  after  having  to  remain  here  for  weeks  and  months,  of- 
ten have  to  go  away  without  a  full  and  satisfactory  inter- 
view with  the  president.  Besides  hearing  aud  considering 
the  innumerable  applications  for  appointments  to,  aud  re- 
movals from  office,  consulting  with  politicians  about  polit- 
ical and  party  management  and  movements,  and  attendiug 
to  the  routine  business  of  cabinet  meetings,  and  the  calls 


4 


of  Members  of  Congress,  and  other  public  officers  and  pri- 
vate citizens,  the  president  has  no  time  left  to  devote  to 
the  great  matters  of  internal  and  external  policy  touching 
the  peculiar  interests  of  the  several  distinctive  sections  of 
the  country.  It  is,  therefore,  undeniably  essential  to  a  just 
and  perfect  representation  of  the  people,  and  a  complete 
and  efficient  administration  of  the  Executive  authority, 
that  there  should  be  several  Chief  Executive  Magistrates 
to  increase  the  Executive  force,  as  well  as  to  represent  the 
various  distinctive  sections  of  the  country. 

There  can  certainly  be  no  valid  objection  to  the  pro- 
posed amendment,  unless  there  be  something  in  the  nature 
of  the  Chief  Executive  office  essentially  requiring  a  single 
and  forbidding  a  plural  Executive.  How  is  this  ?  Is  there 
anything  in  the  nature  of  the  Chief  Executive  authority 
essentially  repuguant  to  a  plural  Executive  ?  If  the  people 
desire  and  require  a  monarchy,  either  absolute  or  limited, 
hereditary  or  elective,  there  must  be  a  unity  in  the  Execu- 
tive, and  a  plural  Executive  would  be  inconsistent  with 
the  nature  of  that  form  of  government.  For  monarchy  in 
its  essential  nature  is  "  the  form  of  government  ivherein  the 
supreme  power  is  vested  in  a  single  person."  If  absolute,  the 
whole  supreme  power ;  if  limited,  only  a  part  of  the  supreme 
power  is  vested  in  the  one  person.  The  office  may  be  her- 
editary, or  the  monarch  may  be  elected  directly  or  indirectly 
by  the  people.  But  &  plural  Executive  is  not,  and  cannot 
be  repugnant  to  the  nature  of  a  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment, for  the  fundamental  principle  of  that  is  popular 
representation. 

The  republics  which  have  lasted  the  longest,  displayed 
the  greatest  energy  and  efficiency,  and  afforded  the  beet 
protection  to  the  rights  of  person  and  property,  have  had 
a  plural  Executive. 

The  ancient  republic  of  Carthage  was  maintained  over 
five  hundred  years,  and  became  a  great  commercial  coun- 
try, which  disputed  the  empire  of  the  world  with  Rome, 
under  a  plural  executive,  composed  of  two  Chief  Executive 


5 


magistrates,  called  Suffetes.  It  had  also  a  Senate  and  a 
Council  of  the  people.  Aristotle  compared  it  with  the 
constitutions  of  Sparta  and  Crete,  and  honored  it  with 
commendation,  upon  the  ground  that  it  had  maintained 
the  liberties  of  a  numerous  people  for  many  centuries,  and 
"  had  never  suffered  from  any  serious  sedition,  nor  endured 
the  yoke  of  a  tyrant." 

The  Roman  republic  which  flourished  and  became  the 
most  powerful  government  of  ancient  times,  lasted  over 
four  hundred  and  sixty  years,  under  the  guidance  of  a  plu- 
ral Executive.  No  other  government,  ancient  or  modern, 
displayed  greater  energy  and  efficiency  in  the  exercise  of 
its  Executive  powers  than  that  of  the  Roman  republic, 
which  was  signalized  in  the  fact,  that  the  title  of  "Roman 
citizen"  became  not  only  a  mark  of  honor,  but  a  shield  of 
protection  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 

In  the  Grecian  republics  such  a  thing  as  a  single  Exec- 
utive was  unknown.  When  the  people  of  Athens  abol- 
ished their  monarchy,  they  declared  that  Jupiter  alone  was 
king  of  Athens,  and  the  republic  of  Athens  was  maintained 
over  nine  hundred  years  under  a  plural  Executive.  Their 
chief  Executive  authority  was  administered  by  nine  mag- 
istrates, called  Archons.  The  Senate  or  Court  of  Areopa- 
gus in  some  respects  exercised  a  restraining  power  over 
the  Archons.  The  republic  attained  great  power,  and  ex- 
hibited wonderful  energy  and  efficiency  in  war  as  well  as 
in  peace.  Of  all  the  Grecian  States  Athens  was  the  most 
eminent  in  civilization  and  freedom,  and  indeed,  became 
the  intellectual  centre  not  only  of  Greece,  but  of  ancient 
Europe,  and  her  history  presents  an  example  of  the  fullest 
development  of  a  democratic  republic. 

The  Executive  power  in  Sparta  was  vested  in  two  mag- 
tstrates  of  equal  authority  called  kings,  who  were  subject 
to  the  superintending  and  controlling  authority  of  a  coun- 
cil of  five,  called  the  Uphori.  There  was  also  a  Senate  and 
a  popular  Assembly.  This  republic  displayed  great  energy 
and  power  of  action,  and  lasted  over  seven  hundred  years. 


6 


The  republics  of  the  other  Grecian  States,  which  main- 
tained their  liberties  through  many  centuries,  were  illus- 
trative of  the  same  result  as  to  a  plural  Executive. 

The  Achaean  League  was  a  federal  union  of  Grecian  re- 
publics,  in  which  the  people  as  well  as  the  States  were  re- 
presented, and  was  maintained  one  hundred  and  forty 
years,  until  the  subjugation  of  Greece  by  the  Romans. 
This  confederacy  had  an  executive  council  of  ten  chief 
magistrates,  a  general  assembly  in  which  the  sovereignty 
was  vested,  and  a  general  in  chief  of  the  armies,  who  exer- 
cised some  civil  as  well  as  military  power. 

The  Republic  of  Switzerland,  formerly  known  as  the 
Helvetian  republic,  situated  in  the  centre  of  Europe,  has 
maintained  the  liberties  of  the  people  against  the  powerful 
monarchies  around  it  for  five  hundred  and  sixty-seven 
years,  under  a  plural  executive.  And  it  is  to  this  day  exist- 
ing in  the  height  of  its  prosperity  and  power  as  a  Federal 
Union  of  cantons  or  States,  with  the  chief  executive  power 
vested  in  a  federal  council  of  seven  members  elected  every 
three  years  by  "  the  Federal  Assembly."  The  supreme  au- 
thority of  the  republic  is  vested  in  a  parliament  of  two 
chambers,  one  of  which  called  "the  State  Council"  is  com- 
posed of  44  members,  elected  by  the  twenty-two  cantons 
of  the  confederation,  two  by  each  canton;  and  the  other 
of  which  chambers,  called  "  the  National  Council,"  is  com- 
posed of  135  representatives  of  the  Swiss  people,  chosen  in 
a  direct  election,  at  the  rate  of  one  representative  for  every 
20,000  of  the  people.  The  joint  meeting  of  these  two 
bodies  called  "the  Federal  Assembly"  elects  the  chief 
executive  council  of  seven,  and  also  the  president  of  the 
council  from  the  seven  members  composing  the  council. 
But  the  president  of  the  council  has  no  prerogative  or  ex- 
ecutive power  beyond  that  of  any  other  member  of  the 
council. 

It  is  an  incontestible  fact,  that  every  prominent  republic 
of  past  times,  which  exhibited  great  energy,  vigor  and 


7 


efficiency,  and  was  able  to  maintain  itself  for  any  great 
length  of  time,  had  a  plural  executive. 

A  Plural  Executive  the  only  Republican  Form. 

There  cannot  be  any  thing,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of 
the  Executive  authority  of  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment essentially  repugnant  to  a  plural  Executive.  In  a 
monarchy,  which  is  a  government  of  one  man,  there  can- 
not be  a  plural  Executive  in  the  nature  of  things,  for  the 
unity  in  the  head  or  single  Executive  is  the  monarch  him- 
self. But  in  a  republic,  which  is  a  government  of  the  peo- 
ple by  means  of  representation,  there  is  no  such  repugnan- 
cy ;  on  the  contrary  the  more  perfect  the  popular  represen- 
tation the  more  perfect  is  the  government,  so  far  as  repre- 
sentation is  practiable  and  consistent  with  the  public  in- 
terests. The  legislative  or  law  making  branch  admits  of 
a  larger  and  more  numerous  representation,  as  deliberation 
and  mature  consideration  are  essentially  important  in  the 
enactment  of  laws.  And  as  to  the  legislature  it  has  been 
said,  that  promptitute  of  actiou  is  oftener  an  evil  than  a 
benefit.  Hence  in  the  best  regulated  governments  the 
legislature  consists  of  two  Houses,  so  that  one  may  be  a 
check  on  the  other  to  prevent  hasty  legislation.  But  in 
the  executive  and  judicial  branches,  dispatch  and  prompt- 
itude of  decision  and  action,  so  far  as  may  be  consistent 
with  a  clear  and  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  sub- 
ject matter,  are  important.  Hence  in  the  executive  as  well 
as  in  the  judicial  branch,  the  number  of  the  incumbents 
should  not  be  inconveniently  large  so  as  to  occasion  un- 
necessary delay  or  tardy  action.  The  number  of  three,  or 
five,  or  seven,  or  even  nine,  have  been  found  prompt,  and 
to  act  with  great  energy  aud  efficiency,  both  in  the  exe- 
cutive as  well  as  the  judiciary.  The  nine  archons  of 
Athens,  and  the  executive  couucil  of  seven  in  Switzerland, 
were  for  many  centuries  unequalled  in  energy  and  effici- 
ency by  the  monarchies  around  them.    But  for  greater 


8 


certainty  in  avoiding  tardy  action  by  the  members  of  the 
Executive,  the  proposed  amendment  provides  for  only 
three,  a  number  of  persons  who,  acting  by  a  decision  of 
the  majority,  can  certainly  act  with  as  much  energy  and 
dispatch,  and  better  comprehension  of  the  subject-matter, 
than  a  single  person  could  possibly  do. 

The  Influence  of  the  American  Example  of  a  Single  Ex- 
ecutive. 

Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States,  such  a  thing  as  a  republic  with  the  supreme  Exec- 
utive power  vested  in  the  hands  of  a  single  person  was  at 
least  rare,  and  no  such  government  had  ever  acquired  any 
great  distinction  for  stability  and  permanency.  Subse- 
quently, however,  the  example  of  the  United  States  in  this 
regard  was  followed  by  the  people  of  Mexico,  and  also  of 
some  of  the  South  American  States,  as  well  as  by  the  peo- 
ple of  France,  in  numerous  attempts  to  maintain  republi- 
can government  with  a  single  Executive.  But  it  must  be 
conceded,  that  these  various  experiments,  as  to  stabil- 
ity and  permanency  at  least,  have  not  been  successful,  but 
to  a  great  extent,  failures.  With  a  plural  Executive  these 
countries  might  have  had,  and  probably  would  have  had, 
different  results.  In  the  United  States  the  republican  ex- 
periment has  been  more  successful  hitherto,  but  mainly  on 
account  of  the  counteracting  influence  of  the  State  dynas- 
ties in  preventing  centralization  of  power  and  checking 
the  inevitable  tendencies  to  absolute  monarchy.  But  the 
country  is  not  now  free  from  impending  dangers,  which 
the  proposed  amendment,  if  adopted,  would  certainly  re- 
move. 

The  tendency  and  natural  result,  however,  of  a  single 
Executive  in  a  republic,  unrestrained  by  local  State  dynas- 
ties, have  been  exemplified  in  a  signal  example  of  recent 
times,  which  cannot  have  faded  from  the  recollections  of 
the  present  generation.    The  people  of  France,  one  of  the 


9 


most  enlightened  and  highly  civilized  nations  of  the  world, 
have  frequently  shown  a  desire  for  a  republican  form  of 
government  since  the  expulsion  of  the  Bourbons.  In  May, 
1848,  the  people  of  that  country  established  a  republic, 
and  in  December  of  that  year  Louis  Napoleon,  under  pro- 
fessions of  extraordinary  attachment  and  devotion  to  re- 
publicanism, was  elected  President  of  the  French  republic 
under  a  constitution  modeled  after  the  plan  of  that  of  the 
United  States.  And  in  less  than  four  years,  in  defiance  of 
the  staunch  republicans  of  the  National  Assembly,  headed 
by  VictorHugo,  aud  others  like  him,  he  did,  by  consummate 
chicanery  and  subtle  artifice,  through  his  powers  as  Presi- 
dent in  the  command  of  the  army  and  navy  aud  the  exercise 
of  official  patronage,  convert  the  republic  into  an  imperial 
monarchy.  Here  in  our  own  times,  before  the  eyes  of  the 
world,  is  a  demonstration  of  the  danger  of  a  single  Execu- 
tive to  the  liberties  of  a  free  people.  If  there  had  been  a 
plural  Executive  of  three  or  five  persons,  selected  from 
different  parts  of  the  country,  in  the  republic  of  France  at 
that  time,  it  is  undeniable  that  no  such  clandestine  usur- 
pation could  have  robbed  the  people  of  their  liberties. 

What  was  said  on  this  subject  in  the  Convention  in  Forming 
the  Constitution. 

In  the  convention  which  formed  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  it  was  not  even  claimed  by  Alexander  Ham- 
ilton, who  was  the  most  strenuous  advocate  for  a  single 
Executive,  that  it  was  republican  in  form.  On  this  subject 
he  said,  "  As  to  the  Executive,  it  seemed  to  be  admitted, 
that  no  good  one  could  be  established  on  republican  prin- 
ciples." (The  Madison  Papers,  Vol.  2,  p.  887.)  He  fur- 
ther said,  (see  same  page,)  "The  English  model  was  the 
only  good  one  on  this  subject.  The  hereditary  interest  of 
the  King  was  so  interwoven  with  that  of  the  nation,  and 
his  personal  emolument  so  great,  that  he  was  placed  above 
the  danger  of  being  corrupted  from  abroad,"  &c.  And 


10 


again,  on  p.  888  ibid,  be  said,  "Let  one  branch  of  the 
Legislature  hold  their  places  for  life,  or  at  least  during 
good  behavior.    Let  the  Executive  also  be  for  life,"  &c. 

The  members  of  the  convention,  raised  and  educated  un- 
der a  monarchy,  and  in  the  literature,  and  a  part  of  them 
in  the  Colleges,  of  Great  Britain,  had  been  taught  from 
early  youth  to  look  upon  the  British  government  as  a 
model  of  perfection.  And  hence  they  readily  adopted  the 
idea  of  a  single  Executive. 

For  the  organization  of  the  Executive,  however,  three 
several  plans  were  submitted  to  the  convention.  One  was 
for  an  Executive  of  three  members,  to  be  taken  from  the 
different  parts  of  the  country  ;  another  was  a  single  Execu- 
tive in  connection  with  an  executive  council  of  five,  on  the 
plan  of  the  Grecian  Ephori ;  and  the  third  was  a  single 
Executive  un restricted. 

On  pages  763-64,  Madison  Papers,  Vol.  2,  the  following 
appears:  "Mr.  Randolph  streuuonsly  opposed  an  unity  in 
the  Executive  magistracy.  He  regarded  it  as  the  foetus  of 
monarchy.  We  had,  he  said,  no  motive  to  be  governed 
by  the  British  government  as  our  prototype."  ..."  The 
fixed  genius  of  the  people  of  America  required  a  different 
form  of  government.  He  could  not  see  why  the  great  re- 
quisites for  the  executive  department,  vigor,  dispatch  and 
responsibility,  could  not  be  found  in  three  men  as  well  as  in 
one  man.  The  Executive  ought  to  be  independent.  It 
ought,  therefore,  iu  order  to  support  its  independence,  to 
consist  of  more  thau  one." 

Doctor  Franklin  proposed  as  a  substitute  for  the  provis- 
ion as  to  the  compensation  for  the  services  of  the  Execu- 
tive, that  his  necessary  expenses  should  be  defrayed,  but 
that  he  should  receive  no  salary,  stipend,  fee,  or  reward 
whatsoever  for  his  services.  This  was  Washington's  plan, 
which  he  inculcated  by  his  own  example.  For  eight  years 
he  executed  most  efficiently  the  most  trying  position  of 
General  of  the  Armies  on  the  simple  payment  of  his  neces- 
sary expenses,  and  without  any  salary  whatever.    And  the 


11 


same  rule  he  rigidly  observed  during  the  eight  years  of  his 
presidency,  (see  Washington's  Inaugural  Address  of  April 
30th,  1789.)  In  supporting  his  proposition  Doctor  Frank- 
lin argued,  that  ambition  and  cupidity, — "  the  love  of 
power,  and  the  love  of  money," — were  the  rocks  upon  which 
free  government  had  been  uniformly  wrecked.  These  two 
objects  when  united  "have  in  many  minds  the  most  vio- 
lent effects."  "Place  before  the  eyes  of  such  men,"  said 
he,  "a  post  of  honor,  that  shall  be  at  the  same  time  a  place 
of  profit,  and  they  will  move  heaven  and  earth  to  obtain  it." 
He  further  said,  "That  he  had  a  better  opinion  of  the 
country  than  to  think,  that  it  would  ever  be  without  a  suf- 
ficent  number  of  wise  and  good  men  to  undertake,  and  exe- 
cute well  and  faithfully  the  office  in  question,  on  simply 
the  payment  of  their  expenses."  And  touching  the  ques- 
tion of  a  single  executive,  and  compensation  for  services 
to  be  fixed  by  Congress,  he  said,  that  "  there  is  a  natural 
inclination  in  mankind  to  kingly  government."  .  .  .  "I 
am  apprehensive,  therefore,  perhaps  too  apprehensive,  that 
the  government  of  these  States  may  in  future  times  end  in 
a  monarchy."  ...  .  "It  will  only  nourish  the  foetus  of  a 
king,  as  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Virginia  very  aptly 
expressed  it,  and  a  king  will  the  sooner  be  set  over  us;" 
(pages  771  and  773,  Vol.  2,  Madison  Papers.) 

And  after  the  vote  had  been  taken  deciding  in  favor  of 
a  single  executive,  Col.  Mason,  said,  "  We  are  going  very 
far  in  this  business.  We  are  not  indeed  constituting  a  Brit- 
ish government,  but  a  more  dangerous  monarchy,  an  elective 
one,"  &c,  (ibid,  p.  788.) 

And  Mr.  Williamson,  (on  p.  1189,  ibid,)  said,  "He  did 
not  like  the  unity  in  the  Executive.  He  had  wished  the 
Executive  power  to  be  lodged  in  three  men,  taken  from 
three  districts  into  which  the  States  should  be  divided." 

 "Another  objection  against  a  single  magistrate  is, 

that  he  will  be  an  elective  king,  and  will  feel  the  spirit  of 
one,"  &c. 

It  is  very  manifest  from  the  debates  of  the  convention 


12 


in  framing  the  constitution,  that,  if  the  vast  enlargement 
of  the  country,  and  the  exaltation  of  the  Executive  powers, 
which  have  taken  place,  could  have  been  then  fully  antici- 
pated and  appreciated,  the  Executive  power  unrestricted 
as  it  is  would  never  have  been  vested  in  a  single  person. 

The  enlargement  of  the  executive  powers  by  construc- 
tion given  to  the  constitution  and  the  statutes  has  not  been 
behind  that  growing  out  of  the  territorial  extension  of  the 
country.  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  favored  the  largest 
grant  of  executive  power  to  the  president  in  framing  the 
constitution,  said,  in  advocating  its  adoption,  in  his  77th 
number  of  the  Federalist,  (edition  of  '73,  p.  568  :) 

"It  has  been  mentioned  as  one  of  the  advantages  to  be 
expected  from  the  co-operation  of  the  Senate,  in  the  busi- 
ness of  appointments,  that  it  would  contribute  to  the  sta- 
bility of  the  administration.  The  consent  of  that  body  would 
be  necessary  to  displace  as  well  as  to  appoint.  A  change  of 
the  chief  magistrate,  therefore,  would  not  occasiou  so  vio- 
lent or  so  general  a  revolution  in  the  officers  of  the  gov- 
ernment as  might  be  expected,  if  he  were  the  sole  disposer 
of  offices.  Where  a  man,  in  any  station,  had  given  satis- 
factory evidence  of  his  fitness  for  it,  a  new  president  would 
be  restrained  from  attempting  a  change  in  favor  of  a  per- 
son more  agreeable  to  him,  by  the  apprehension  that  the 
discountenance  of  the  Senate  might  frustrate  the  attempt, 
and  bring  some  degree  of  discredit  upon  himself,"  &c. 

Yet  no  sooner  di  1  the  country  become  the  plunder 
ground  between  two  great  contending  political  parties, 
than  this  clearly  accurate  construction  of  the  constitution 
was  repudiated  by  Congress;  and  it  is  now  settled  in  prac- 
tice, that  the  power  of  removing  officers,  for  whose  ap- 
pointment a  confirmation  by  the  Senate  was  necessary, 
belonged  exclusively  to  the  president  without  the  appro- 
val or  conseut  of  the  Senate. 

Argument  for  a  Single  Executive  untenable. 

The  chief  ground  of  objection  to  a  plural  executive,  ur- 
ged by  Mr.  Hamilton  in  the  convention,  and  also  in  his 


13 


70th  number  of  the  Federalist,  consists  in  alleged  want  of 
vigor  or  energy,  and  want  of  dispatch,  and  responsibility. 

But  this  argument  of  Mr.  Hamilton,  although  ingenious 
and  plausible,  will  not  bear  the  test  of  scrutiny,  and  is 
overthrown  utterly  by  the  practical  experience  in  repub- 
lics with  plural  executives.  Indeed,  when  closely  tested, 
Mr.  Hamilton's  arguments  will  be  fouud  to  rest  on  bold 
assumptions  and  unwarranted  conclusions. 

The  assumption  that  a  council  of  three  cannot  act  with 
as  much  dispatch  and  energy  as  one  mau  is  preposterous. 
Three  can  confer  together,  and  decide  by  a  vote  of  a  ma- 
jority, as  readily  as  a  single  executive  could  deliberate,  and 
decide  satisfactorily  of  himself.  The  latter  would  usual- 
ly advise  with  his  subordinates,  or  his  coterie  of  friends 
around  him,  who  being  irresponsible  and  unknown  to  the 
public  would  be  likely  under  sinister  influences  to  mis- 
lead him.  An  irresponsible  "power  behind  the  throne 
greater  than  the  throue  itself,"  or  to  use  an  Americanism, 
"  a  kitchen  cabinet"  is  an  unavoidable  accompaniment  of 
a  siugle  executive.  Far  better  have  three  to  act,  each  of 
whom  would  not  only  be  known,  but  also  responsible  to 
the  country,  because  selected  and  elected  by  the  people 
for  the  purpose.  And  the  assumption,  that  a  plural  num- 
ber of  the  executive  would  dispute,  wrangle  or  altercate 
with  each  other,  and  be  unable  to  decide,  is  inconsistent 
with  the  nature  of  the  position,  and  the  responsibilities 
imposed  by  it.  When  three  or  more  public  men,  taken 
from  different  parts  of  the  country,  have  heretofore  become 
associated  with  each  other  upon  a  high  commission,  or 
upon  the  Bench  of  the  Supreme  Court,  their  bearing  and 
conduct  have  ever  been  courteous  and  dignified,  and  they 
have  faithfully  devoted  themselves  to  the  proper  dischaige 
of  their  duties.  In  the  case  of  a  plural  executive,  the  eyes  of 
the  people  of  the  whole  country  would  be  upon  them,  and 
each  one  of  them  would  have  a  common  interest  in  giv- 
ing character  to  their  administration  of  the  public  affairs  for 
eflicieucy  and  success.    Wrangling  and  discord  in  the  coun- 


14 


cil,  before  the  eyes  of  the  nation,  would  disgrace  the  ad- 
ministration, and  each  member  of  the  executive  body  ;  and 
the  supposition  of  such  a  thing  is  inconsistent  with  the  na- 
ture of  human  conduct  under  such  high  responsibilties. 
To  act  with  becoming  dispatch  and  energy  would  be  en- 
joined upon  each,  so  that  each  one  would  be  naturally  in- 
clined to  prompt  and  aid  the  others  to  decisive  action. 
Hesitation,  doubt,  and  procrastination  have  sometimes 
characterized  the  action  of  a  single  executive  to  the  detri- 
ment and  annoyance  of  the  country,  when  if  there  had 
been  a  plural  executive  such  difficulty  would  have  been 
avoided.  When  an  executive  act  is  made  the  high  duty 
of  three  public  functionaries,  prompt  and  efficient  action 
is  more  certain  to  take  place  than  where  enjoined  on  a  sin- 
gle person.  The  assumption  that  three  executives  would 
vie  with  each  other,  each  have  a  separate  opinion,  and  be 
unable  to  decide,  even  by  a  majority,  where  action  is  en- 
joined upon  them  as  a  duty,  is  absurd  and  irrational. 
With  greater  reason  could  the  objection  be  urged  against 
a  single  executive,  that  unaided  by  co-ordinates,  he  would 
doubt,  hesitate,  and  be  often  unable  to  act  at  all.  Either 
hypothesis  is  alike  inconsistent  with  the  uniform  conduct 
of  public  functionaries.  Oar  own  country  has  actual  ex- 
perience in  the  judiciary,  of  courts  of  single,  and  of  plural 
members  upon  the  bench.  And  it  is  undeniable,  that 
three  or  five  judges  on  the  bench  are  found  to  act  with  less 
hesitation,  and  with  more  dispatch  and  vigor  than  a  sin- 
gle judge.  Three  heads  are  better  than  one.  And  the 
proverb,  that  in  the  multitude  of  councellors  there  is  safety, 
has  not  been  exploded. 

In  the  case  of  three  Executives  taken  from  the  different 
sections  of  the  country,  each  would  bring  all  his  intelli- 
gence and  mental  power  into  their  consultations,  and  the 
suggestions  and  views  of  one  would  be  aids  to  the  others. 
And  it  would  be  neither  fair  nor  rational  to  deny,  that 
there  would  be  more  mental  vigor  and  wisdom  in  their 
conclusions,  and  more  energy  and  efficiency  in  the  action 


15 


of  the  three,  than  there  could  possibly  be  in  that  of  a  sin- 
gle Executive. 

And  as  to  responsibility,  on  the  plan  proposed  by  the 
amendment,  each  of  the  three  Executives  would  be  per- 
sonally responsible  to  the  whole  people  of  the  United 
States,  so  that  the  country  would  have  the  benefit  of  the 
individual  as  well  as  the  joint  responsibility  of  the  three 
instead  of  that  of  a  single  person.  There  could  be  no  possi- 
bility, on  this  plan,  of  one  of  them  shielding  himself  behind 
the  action  of  the  others,  for  each  would  be  responsible 
and  have  to  stand  before  the  country  ou  his  own  vote  and 
conduct.  And  the  actual  responsibility  to  the  country 
would  be  three-fold  as  great  as  in  case  of  a  single  Execu- 
tive. The  argument  of  Mr.  Hamilton  on  this  point  is 
wholly  inapplicable  to  a  plural  Executive  as  here  proposed, 
and  is  directed  mainly  to  the  case  of  a  single  Executive 
under  the  check  of  a  supervising  council. 

But  history,  which  "is  philosophy  teaching  by  exam- 
ple," has  demonstrated  the  utter  fallacy  of  Mr.  Hamilton's 
argument  against  a  plural  Executive.  The  republics  of 
other  countries  and  ages,  noticed  above,  one  of  which  is 
still  existing  in  the  height  of  its  power,  and  all  of  which 
maintained  the  liberties  of  the  people  through  a  series  of 
centuries  against  the  neighboring  monarchies,  have  showu 
by  illustrious  examples,  that  a  plural  Executive  is  not 
wanting  in  either  energy,  dispatch  or  responsibility,  and 
not  liable  to  the  objections  asserted  by  Mr.  Hamilton,  who 
was  confessedly  an  advocate  of  a  qualified  monarchy. 

Indeed,  the  government  of  Great  Britain  itself  furnishes 
a  striking  illustration  of  the  fallacy  of  Mr.  Hamilton's  ar- 
gument. The  Executive  power  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
although  vested  nominally  in  the  Crown,  is  practically 
vested  in  the  Cabinet  Ministry,  composed  of  twelve  minis- 
ters, a  body  which  has  absorbed  the  functions  of  "  the 
King  in  Council,"  and  has  for  the  last  century  and  more 
exercised  the  executive  power  of  the  British  government 
with  consummate  ability.    And  no  such  defects  as  those 


I 

16 

ascribed  by  Mr.  Hamilton  to  a  plural  Executive  have  ever 
been  witnessed  in  the  administration  of  the  British  govern- 
ment. On  the  contrary,  the  ministry  have  wielded  the 
executive  power  with  a  vigor  and  dispatch  unsurpassed; 
and  as  to  responsibility,  the  British  Ministry  have  shown 
an  obedience  and  responsibility  to  public  opinion  une- 
qualled in  any  other  country. 

The  Condition  of  Affairs  at  the  Fall  of  the  Roman  and 
French  Republics  present  no  Analogy. 

No  inferences  are  justifiable  against  a  plural  Executive 
here  from  the  circumstances  attending  the  subversion  of 
either  the  Roman  republic  by  Caesar,  or  the  republic  of 
France  by  Napoleon  Bonaparte, — on  the  contrary,  those 
historical  events  furnish  signal  illustrations  of  the  dangers 
attending  the  concentration  of  the  executive  power  in  the 
hands  of  a  single  person. 

In  the  degenerate  clays  of  Rome,  when  the  people  were 
corrupted  by  the  distribution  of  subsidies  and  emoluments 
derived  from  conquered  provinces,  Caesar,  Pompey  and 
Crassus  formed  the  coalition  known  as  the  first  triumvir- 
ate, an  illegal  combination,  which  virtually  usurped  the 
functions  of  the  consuls.  But  they  never  acted  together 
as  a  council  or  board  of  chief  magistrates.  On  the  con- 
trary, separate  and  distinct  duties  were  assigned  them  in 
different  and  distinct  parts  of  the  country.  Caesar  had 
command  of  the  army,  and  the  exclusive  charge  of  the 
government  of  the  extensive  territories  on  both  sides 
of  the  Alps  designated  as  Gallia  Cisalpina  and  Transal- 
pina.  Pompey  had  the  charge  of  the  army  and  govern- 
ment in  Spain,  and  Crassus  of  the  army,  &c,  in  Syria, 
Greece  and  Egypt.  The  last  named  leader,  having  en- 
gaged in  an  inconsiderate  expedition  against  the  Parthians, 
was  defeated  and  slain  in  battle.  Caesar,  who  had  capti- 
vated the  Roman  people  by  his  military  exploits,  and  the 
booty  he  had  sent  to  Rome  and  distributed  among  the  peo- 
ple, crossed  the  Rubicon  at  the  head  of  his  army,  and 


17 


marched  upon  Rome,  when  his  political  adherents  declared 
him  dictator  with  the  title  of  imperator.  On  the  approach 
of  Caesar,  Pompey  being  then  in  Rome  departed  and  en- 
gaged in  raising  an  army  to  check  the  dangerous  move- 
ments of  Caesar,  and  he  was  then  declared  sole  consul  by 
the  Roman  Senate.  And  Csesar,  after  taking  forcibly  from 
the  public  treasury  what  money  he  wanted,  followed  Pom- 
pey  with  his  military  forces.  And  after  numerous  military 
movements  and  several  engagements,  the  two  Roman  ar- 
mies met  and  fought  the  noted  battle  of  Pharsalia,  where 
Pompey  was  defeated,  and  immediately  afterwards  fled 
from  the  country.  After  this  Csesar  controlled  the  destiny 
of  the  Roman  government  until  the  tragedy  of  his  death 
in  the  Senate  Chamber.  The  two  consuls,  the  chief  exec- 
utive magistrates,  still  existed,  but  the  civil  authority  be- 
ing wholly  paralyzed  by  the  supremacy  or  usurpation  of 
the  military  chieftains,  the  republic  was  in  a  state  of  abso- 
lute disorganization. 

The  state  and  condition  of  affairs  here  presented  bears 
no  parallel  or  analogy  whatsoever  to  a  well  regulated  civil 
organization  of  a  republic  where  the  military  is  made  sub- 
ordinate to  the  civil  power.  It  simply  shows  a  total  loss 
of  the  essential  requisites  for  free  government. 

And  the  overthrow  of  the  French  republic  by  Napoleon, 
in  1799,  occurred  also  under  a  6tate  and  conditiou  of 
things  even  more  at  variance,  if  possible,  with  the  in- 
stitutions and  circumstances  of  an  established  republic. 
France  had  just  emerged  from  the  bloodj7  and  horrid 
scenes  of  the  Revolution,  and  abandoned  the  impracticable 
and  inefficient  measures  of  the  Directory,  by  instituting 
the  Provisional  Consulate,  which  was  composed  of  three 
Consuls,  Bonaparte,  Sieyes  and  Roger-Ducos.  Nothing 
was  settled,  but  everything  in  commotion  at  the  time. 
This  triumvirate  never  acted  as  a  Board  or  Council  at  all, 
except  at  the  beginning  to  make  a  division  of  their  labors 
and  responsibilities.  Bonaparte  was  made  First  Consul, 
and  the  command  of  the  army  and  eutire  direction  of  the 


18 


government  was  committed  to  him.  Sieves  was  allotted 
the  duty  of  preparing  the  constitution  for  the  government. 
Aud  Roger-Ducos  being  "  a  man  of  limited  and  easy  char- 
acter," left  everything  to  his  colleagues.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances Bonaparte  had  everything  in  his  own  hands  as 
much  as  if  he  had  been  the  sole  or  single  Executive,  and 
with  the  eclat  of  his  military  exploits  he  had  no  difficulty 
in  converting  the  republic  into  an  empire  in  a  short  time. 

The  subversion  of  republican  government,  in  both  these 
instances,  occurred  at  a  time  of  great  popular  commotion 
and  excitement,  and  under  gross  defects,  if  not  the  abso- 
lute want  of  organization  and  system,  in  the  Executive 
department.  The  Consuls  were  not  selected  as  representa- 
tives of  the  people  from  different  sections  of  the  country. 
And  they  did  not  confer  and  deliberate  together  as  an 
Executive  Council,  and  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  ex- 
ecutive as  a  distinct  branch  of  government.  Ou  the  con- 
trary, they  abandoned  the  civil  authority  of  the  executive, 
and  were  overwhelmed  by  the  usurpations  of  the  military. 

The  amendment  proposed  requires  the  action  of  the 
three  presidents  in  joint  council,  and  forbids  either  of  them 
the  taking  command  of  an  army  in  the  field.  And  the 
selection  of  these  high  public  functionaries  from  the  dif- 
ferent sections  of  the  country,  would  give  each  of  them  a 
distinctive  character  as  a  representative  of  the  people  in 
the  Executive  councils,  and  make  them  aids  to,  and  checks 
upon,  each  other.  And  the  people  of  each  presidential 
district  would  have  an  interest  as  well  as  a  pride  in  being 
represented  by  a  man  of  known  ability,  efficiency  and  in- 
tegrity. So  that  the  degrading  and  dangerous  practice  of 
taking  inefficient  men  for  the  presidency  on  account  of 
mere  availability  would  be  at  once  abandoned. 

Expenses  Reduced,  not  Increased. 

This  proposed  change  in  the  Presidency  will  not  increase 
the  public  expenses.  The  President  of  the  United  States 
at  present  receives  an  annual  salary  of  $50,000,  and  the 


19 


perquisites  of  the  expenses  of  "  the  White  House  "  as  a  res- 
idence, includiug  its  repairs,  servants,  and  other  expenses, 
amounting  to  at  least  $75,000  a  year.  So  that  his  salary 
and  perquisites  at  this  time  amount  to  at  least  $125,000  a 
year.  This  enormous  salary,  with  such  emoluments  and 
perquisites,  was  manifestly  given  to  the  President  for  pur- 
poses of  aggrandisement,  and  with  a  view  to  his  regal  char- 
acter. The  change  proposed  lays  aside  monarchy  and 
substitutes  a  republican  executive  of  three  Presidents,  with 
an  annual  salary  of  $30,000  for  each,  without  any  perqui- 
sites or  emoluments  whatsoever.  This  would  make  a  re- 
duction in  the  expenses  of  the  Presidency  of  §35,000  a 
year,  and  substitute  the  services  of  three  first-class  men  for 
the  services  of  one. 

Indeed,  discarding  the  extravagance  and  voluptuousness 
of  the  monarchical  feature  in  our  government,  a  salary  of 
$20,000  a  year,  without  any  perquisites  or  emoluments, 
things  expressly  forbidden  in  the  constitution,  would  be 
an  ample  and  full  compensation  for  a  President,  and  more 
consistent  with  the  simplicity  of  republican  institutions. 
This  would  save  to  the  people  $65,000  a  year,  and  yet 
give  far  greater  efficiency  and  safety  to  the  executive. 

A  Check  upon  the  Demoralization  of  Presidential  Elections. 

The  change  in  the  Presidential  term  from  four  to  six 
years,  with  ineligibility  after  a  full  term  of  six  years,  has 
the  sanction  of  some  of  the  profoundest  statesmen  of  the 
country  in  past  times;  and  the  election  of  a  President  from 
one  of  the  three  districts  every  two  years  would  simply  make 
the  changes  in  the  Presidency  gradual,  and  to  correspond 
with  the  regular  changes  in  the  United  States  Senate — one- 
third  of  the  Senators  coming  in  every  two  years  and  meet- 
ing Senators  already  posted  and  experienced  in  the  busi- 
ness of  the  Government,  half  of  whom  had  already  served 
four  years,  and  the  other  half  two  years.  The  Presiden- 
tial term  might  be  made  twelve  years,  and  one  of  the  three 


20 


be  elected  every  four  years.  But  the  shorter  period,  cor- 
responding with  the  Senatorial  term,  would  probably  cre- 
ate the  best  responsibility  to  the  people.  The  election  of 
a  President  from  one  of  the  three  districts  every  two  years, 
could  bear  no  similarity  whatever  to  the  present  election 
of  a  single  President  every  four  years,  who  alone  wields 
the  whole  patronage  of  the  government,  and  therefore  dis- 
tributes it  as  rewards  for  political  services.  In  the  plan 
proposed,  the  president  elected  every  two  years  would  him- 
self have  no  patronage  at  his  own  disposal  ;  and  therefore 
such  au  election  could  produce  no  such  popular  commotion 
as  we  now  have  every  four  years. 

The  Enlarged  Powers  of  the  Presidency. 

The  presidency  of  the  United  States  has,  by  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  country,  and  the  exaltation  of  its  powers,  be- 
come in  reality  and  in  fact  a  fully  developed  elective  mon- 
archy, by  whatever  other  name  it  may  be  called.  Invested 
with  the  Supreme  Executive  power  over  the  whole  country, 
the  president  collects  and  disburses  an  annual  revenue  ex- 
ceeding $300,000,000,  and  exercises  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment and  removal  over  at  least  two  hundred  thousand  offi- 
cers and  agents  of  the  United  States,  together  with  an 
influence  over  more  thau  twice  that  number  of  applicants 
and  expectants  of  the  offices,  honors  and  emoluments  of  the 
government.  With  the  qualified  but  primary  power  of 
makiug  treaties  with  foreign  nations,  the  president  has  the 
sole  'power  of  executing  the  treaties,  and  is  the  sole  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  in  their  intercourse  with  for- 
eign nations.  By  his  financial  policy  and  executive  meas- 
ures, the  president  exercises  a  daily  influence  on  the  money 
market  and  exchanges  of  the  country,  domestic  and  for- 
eign, and  consequently  more  or  less,  upon  the  prices  of 
commodities  and  wages  of  labor.  Clothed  with  all  these 
high  powers,  and  made  "  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of 


21 


the  several  States  when  called  into  the  actual  service  of 
the  United  States,"  who  can  deny  that  the  president  has 
become  a  monarch,  wielding  more  power  than  any  one  of 
four-fifths  of  the  monarchs  of  Europe  ? 

These  Monarchical  Powers  made  Absolute  by  the  Ascendency 
of  the  President's  Political  Party. 

Wielding  the  powers  above  mentioned,  a  president 
elected  as  a  political  partisan  is  placed  at  the  head  of  his 
party,  which,  if  in  the  majority  in  both  branches  of  Con- 
gress, and  on  the  bench  of  the  Supreme  Court,  gives  him  a 
controlling  influence  with  both  the  legislative  and  the  judi- 
cial branches  of  the  government.  The  whole  country  has 
recently  seen  how  completely  the  political  majorities  in 
both  branches  of  Congress,  and  on  the  bench  of  the  Su- 
preme Court,  are  under  the  control  of  the  political  party 
in  power.  So  that  the  president  as  the  head  of  the  politi- 
cal party  in  power,  wielding  his  va3t  powers  aud  extensive 
patronage,  would  exercise  a  controlling  influence  over  the 
legislative  and  judicial,  as  well  as  the  Executive  depart- 
ments, and  therefore,  would  exercise  the  powers  of  an  ab- 
solute monarch.  And  the  history  of  the  world  has  shown 
that  the  most  corrupt  and  debasing  of  all  monarchies  is  the 
elective  monarchy.  It  debases  and  corrupts  the  very  foun- 
dations of  society,  and  places  the  control  of  the  country  in 
the  hands  of  men  governed  by  ambition,  cupidity  and 
self-aggrandisement,  crushing  out  all  elevated  patriotism 
and  magnanimous  regard  for  advancement  and  improve- 
ment in  man's  condition.  Far  better  for  the  country  to 
have  a  hereditary  and  absolute  monarchy  at  once. 

The  political  sentiment  most  deeply  rooted  in  the  minds 
of  the  Americau  people  is  to  be  found  in  their  attachment 
to  a  republican  form  of  guvernment,  believing  it  to  be  the 
sheet  anchor  of  their  liberties,  and  the  palladium  of  the 
Union  of  the  States,  And  that  lofty  and  patriotic  senti- 
ment is  taught  iu  the  schools,  and  inculcated  in  the  litcra- 


22 


tn  re  of  the  country;  and  with  the  spirit  of  republican  lib- 
erty which  animates  the  people  throughout  this  vast  coun- 
try, long  and  devastating  wars  must  inevitably  precede  the 
destruction  of  the  freedom  of  the  States  and  of  the  people. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  matter  of  the  highest  moment  to  the  coun- 
try, that  the  constitution  should  be  so  amended  as  to  perfect 
and  preserve  a  representative  republic,  and  guard  against 
the  evils  which  now  threaten  and  endanger  the  perma- 
nency of  our  institutions. 

"The  natural  inclination  of  mankind  to  kingly  govern- 
ment," mentioned  by  Dr.  Franklin,  is  founded  on  that 
instinct  of  human  nature  which  leads  to  hero  worship  or 
doing  homage  to  some  human  idol,  and  frequently  to  his 
apotheosis  after  death,  as  shown  in  various  phases  of  socie- 
ty in  the  course  of  the  history  of  the  world.  It  is  said,  that 
the  Hebrew  when  fed  by  the  bread  of  heaven  murmured 
at  his  God,  and  looked  back  and  pined  for  the  luxurious 
slavery  of  Egypt.  Afterwards,  under  the  dispensation  of 
Judges  guided  by  divine  wisdom,  the  Hebrews  committed 
the  enormous  sin  of  petitioning  for  and  having  a  king  an- 
nointed  to  rule  over  them.  One  of  the  sages  of  old  illus- 
trated the  folly  of  this  act  by  the  fable  of  the  frogs  petition- 
ing Jupiter  for  a  king,  and  he  finally  gave  them  a  stork, 
that  fed  upon  and  devoured  them. 

Whether  monarchy  be  substituted  for  free  government 
by  a  sudden  and  violeut  usurpation,  or  by  gradual  and  in- 
sidious approaches  under  the  semblance  of  republican 
institutions,  it  matters  not,  for  the  basis  of  it  sooner  or 
later  is  inevitably  laid  in  the  division  of  the  people  into 
two  classes,  the  nobility  and  the  commonalty.  And  for 
the  purposes  of  subordination,  sooner  or  later  the  doctrine 
of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  and  that  the  king  can  do 
no  wrong,  with  all  the  other  degrading  superstitions  of 
king-craft,  will  be  inculcated  among  the  masses  of  the  peo- 
ple. How  soon  the  spirit  of  liberty  among  the  American 
people  can  be  subdued,  and  their  necks  be  prepared  for  the 
yoke,  is  veiled  iu  the  mysteries  of  the  future.    But  certain 


23 


it  is,  that  there  will  be  stirring  times,  terrific]" struggles, 
and  havoc  and  slaughter,  such  as  the  world  never  hereto- 
fore witnessed,  before  that  dire  and  dread  event  can  be 
reached.  The  literature  of  the  country  has  taught  the 
present  generation  of  our  public  men,  and  is  teaching  the 
coming  one,  that  death  is  preferable  to  a  loss  of  their  liber- 
ties. And  there  are  champions  and  leaders  among  the  peo- 
ple yet  unknown,  who  will  be  brought  out  to  astonish  the 
world  by  their  prowess,  before  a  usurper  and  a  tyrant  can 
trample  down  the  constitutional  liberties  of  this  country. 
But  it  is  the  part  of  statesmanship  and  wisdom  to  provide 
safeguards  against  threatened  dangers. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

T.  W.  BARTLEY. 

May  25th,  1878. 


The  following  is  a  copy  of  the  Resolutions  : 

Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  (two-thirds  of  each  House 
concurring  therein,)  That  the  following  article  be  proposed  to  the 
legislatures  of  the  several  States  as  an  amendment  to  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States,  and  substitute  for  the  first,  second, 
third  and  fourth  clauses  of  section  one  of  the  second  article  of  said 
Constitution  ;  which,  when  ratified  by  three-fourths  of  said  legis- 
latures, shall  be  valid  as  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  namely  : 

Article  XVI. 

Section  1.  The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in,  and  shall 
be  hereafter  administered  by,  three  Presidents,  constituting  a  Su- 
preme Executive  Council  of  three,  to  be  elected  by  the  qualified 
electors  of  each  and  all  of  the  States,  and  each  to  be  taken  from 
one  of  the  three  several  prominent  sections  of  the  United  States, 
known,  one  as  the  Western  States,  one  as  the  Eastern  and  Middle 
States,  and  the  other  as  the  Southern  States,  and  no  two  of  whom 
should  be  citizens  of  the  same  section  or  district  of  the  country. 
And  the  boundaries  of  each  of  the  said  three  Presidential  districts 
shall  be  defined  specifically,  and  established  by  law. 

Sec.  2.  The  stated  Presidential  term  of  office  shall  be  six  years, 
and  no  President  having  served  a  full  term  shall  be  eligible  for  a 
second  term.  And  at  the  first  election  under  this  article,  the  Pres- 


ident  from  the  Western  district  shall  be  elected  for  a  fractional 

term  of  two  years,  and  the  President  from  the  Southern  district 
for  a  fractional  term  of  four  years,  and  the  President  from  the 
Eastern  aud  Middle  district  for  a  full  term  of  six  years ;  and  after 
the  first  election,  one  President  shall  be  elected  from  one  of  the 
three  several  districts  every  two  years.. 

Sec.  3.  The  time  and  place  of  holdiug  the  elections  for  Presi- 
dent in  the  several  States,  and  the  rules  and  regulations  for  con- 
ducting the  same,  and  the  time  and  mode  of  making  the  returns 
of  such  elections,  and  of  counting  the  votes  and  declaring  the  re- 
sults, shall  be  prescribed  by  Congress. 

Sec.  4.  Each  one  of  the  three  composing  the  Presidential  Coun- 
cil shall  have  all  the  qualifications  to  make  him  eligible  to  the 
office  heretofore  required  of  the  President  of  the  United  States ; 
and  each,  before  enteriug  upon  the  discharge  of  his  duties,  shall 
take  the  oath  of  office  now  required  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States ;  and  each  of  the  three  shall  be  subject  to  the  liability  of 
removal  from  office  on  impeachment  to  which  the  President  is  now 
subjected. 

Sec.  5.  In  electing  the  members  of  the  Supreme  Executive 
Council,  the  qualified  voters  of  each  State  shall  vote  directly  for 
the  candidates  for  such  office;  and  the  three  caudidates  having 
the  highest  number  of  votes  in  any  State  shall  be  entitled  to  the 
vote  of  such  State  in  such  election ;  aud  the  vote  of  each  State 
thus  ascertained  shall  entitle  the  candidates  having  such  highest 
number  of  the  votes  to  a  vote  for  the  Presidential  office  equal  to 
the  whole  number  of  Senators  and  Representatives  to  which  such 
State  may  be  entitled  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States ;  and 
the  three  candidates  having  the  highest  number  of  votes  of  all  the 
States  thus  counted  shall  be  declared  elected  to  the  Presidential 
Council;  and  in  the  case  of  a  tie  in  the  popular  vote  of  any  State, 
or  in  the  count  of  the  votes  in  the  several  States,  every  such  tie 
vote  shall  be  determined  as  Congress  shall  provide  by  law. 

Sec.  6.  The  said  Presidential  Council  shall  have  full  power  to 
perform  all  the  duties  aud  execute  all  the  authority  now  conferred 
and  enjoined  upon  the  President  of  the  United  States;  and,  in  so 
doing,  all  questions  arising  in  the  administration  of  the  executive 
authority,  upon  which  a  difference  of  opinion  may  exist,  shall  be 
decided  promptly  by  a  majority  vote.  Aud  in  the  case  of  the  re- 
moval of  any  member  of  the  Presidential  Council  from  office,  or 
of  the  death,  resignation  or  inability  of  either  to  discharge  the 
powers  and  duties  of  the  said  office,  such  vacancy  shall  be  filled 
by  such  other  officer  of  the  United  States  or  in  such  manner  as 
may  be  provided  by  law.  And  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United*  States  to  prescribe  by  law  the  mode  and  au- 
thority for  filling  all  vacancies  occurring  iu  the  Presidential  Coun- 
cil until  an  election  can  be  duly  held  according  to  law. 

Sec.  7.  A  majority  of  the  Presidential  Council  shall  always  be 
competent  for  the  transaction  of  the  business  of  the  Council ;  and 


25 


in  case  of  the  temporary  vacancy  in  the  places  of  two  members 
of  the  Council  at  any  one  time,  the  remaining  member  shall,  for 
the  time  being,  perform  the  duties  of  the  Council  until  the  vacan- 
cies can  be  filled. 

Sec.  8.  Each  member  of  the  Presidential  Council  shall  be  en- 
titled to  full  information  from  the  heads  of  each  of  the  executive 
departments,  and  also  to  the  opinions  and  suggestions,  in  writing, 
of  any  such  officer  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  business  of 
his  department,  whenever  he  may  require  the  same.  And  the  mil- 
itary and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  shall  be  subject  to  the 
authority  and  control  of  the  Presidential  Council ;  but  no  member 
of  the  Council  shall  take  personal  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
United  States  in  actual  sendee  in  the  field. 

Sec.  9.  The  Supreme  Executive  Council  shall  have  a  journal, 
regularly  kept,  of  their  proceedings,  in  which  the  votes  of  the  sev- 
eral members  shall  be  entered  and  recorded  upon  every  important 
subject  upon  which  a  division  of  opinion  may  arise  ;  and  each  mem- 
ber shall,  when  he  desires  it,  have  a  note  made  on  the  journal  of 
his  reasons  for  any  such  vote  by  him  given.  And  a  duplicate  of 
such  journal  shall  be  sent  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  at 
the  beginning  of  every  regular  session. 

Sec.  10.  Instead  of  the  Vice-President  now  provided  for,  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  shall,  every  four  years,  elect  a  Presi- 
dent of  the  Senate,  who  is  not  a  member  of  that  body,  and  who,  as 
the  presiding  officer  of  the  Senate,  shall  have  and  exercise  all  the 
authority  heretofore  conferred  on  the  Vice-President. 

Sec.  11.  Each  of  the  Presidents  shall,  at  stated  times,  receive 
for  his  services  a  compensation  not  exceeding  thirty  thousand  dol- 
lars a  year,  and  which  shall  neither  be  increased  nor  diminished 
during  the  period  for  which  he  shall  have  been  elected ;  and  nei- 
ther of  the  Presidents  shall  receive  within  that  period  any  other 
emolument  or  perquisite  from  the  United  States,  or  any  of  them, 
either  in  the  way  of  furnishing  him  with  his  dwelling-house,  or 
paying  the  expenses  thereof,  or  otherwise ;  and  all  subsidies,  pres- 
ents, or  donations  to  either  of  the  Presidents  from  any  foreign  gov- 
ernment, prince,  potentate,  or  subject,  or  from  any  resident  of  the 
United  States,  shall  inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  United  States,  and 
be  at  once  delivered  over  to  the  Treasurer  for  that  purpose. 


